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“As If the BeAsts spoke”:  
the AnImAl/AnImIst/ 
AnImAted WAlt WhItmAn
M. JiMMie Killingsworth
walt whitMan’s earliest readers, from the most resistant to the most 
accepting, understood the poet in terms that distinguish humans from 
animals, with Whitman enrolled squarely on the side of the animals. 
Identity with the beasts was used to question Whitman’s morality, 
civility, and artistic sensibility.  In a review of Leaves of Grass in 1855, 
Rufus Griswold produced this cartoon-like image:  “it is impossible 
to imagine how any man’s fancy could have conceived such a mass 
of stupid filth, unless he were possessed of the soul of a sentimental 
donkey that had died of disappointed love.”1  But animal language was 
also used to credit the poet’s freshness and energy.  In an 1856 letter 
to thomas Carlyle, Ralph Waldo emerson expressed an ambivalent 
admiration by calling Whitman’s book a “nondescript monster” that yet 
had “terrible eyes and buffalo strength.”2  the “terrible eyes”—in the 
old sense meaning terrifying—recall the words of emerson’s neighbor 
and protégé henry david thoreau: “Give me a wildness whose glance 
no civilization can endure” for “in Wildness is the preservation of the 
World.”3  In a much-quoted series of letters to harrison Blake which 
recount a visit to Whitman as well as a thoughtful reading of his book, 
thoreau joined emerson in confessing mixed feelings about Whitman’s 
sometimes crude language and images before concluding that after all 
he was an inspired poet with much to teach the overly delicate readers 
of thoreau’s own literary class in new england.  thoreau is said to 
have carried Whitman’s book around Concord “like a red flag.”4  Very 
likely Whitman was on his mind in the late 1850s, when in the journal 
entries leading up to his book The Maine Woods, thoreau marveled that 
his native American guide spoke familiarly to muskrats and moose and 
wondered if the Indian languages were closer to natural utterances than 
languages like english.  As for Whitman, thoreau wrote to Blake, “It 
is as if the beasts spoke” (qtd. in Richardson, 349).
the quip is curious at a number of levels.  At the philosophical 
level, thoreau invokes the problem of distinguishing humans from 
animals, particularly of defining the human as the speaking beast, the 
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animal with language.  At the cultural level, he raises the possibility of 
a revived animism—the worldview, supposedly expunged by modern 
religion and science, that grants language and souls to creatures other 
than human.  At the level of rhetoric and poetics, thoreau’s comment 
hints at a boundary-bursting energy in Whitman’s writing that sparks 
insights into the mind of the beast, a form of life typically treated by 
modern thinkers as a body without soul or with a rudimentary mind 
inaccessible to human probing.  taken as a whole, thoreau’s mixed 
expression of amusement and awe suggests how Whitman’s treatment 
of animality in the poems of the 1850s—the decade that ended with 
the publication of darwin’s Origin of Species—anticipates several cul-
tural developments in our own time: in environmental and egalitarian 
politics, in animal activism, and in the rhetoric of genre and media.5  In 
brief, Whitman and thoreau are early participants in a reconditioning 
of the modern imagination that results in an ethical, political, and spiri-
tual re-enchantment or re-animation of nature in a post-religious and 
post-scientific world.  the power of this imaginative vista, as well as its 
limits, can be partly revealed in a closer look at Whitman’s developing 
treatment of these issues throughout his career as a poet.
the PhilosoPhical aniMal, or the Beast sPeaKs—as if
Consider the importance of thoreau’s as if.  While hinting ironically 
at the definition of humans as animals with language, he clearly places 
the poet in the category of the other, the nonhuman animal.  In the 
fully human, the soul initiates speech, not the body, and in the universe 
thoreau inherited almost wholly from plato, the two can be neatly sepa-
rated.  Within the human being, the mute and idiot body is the beast 
that must be tamed by the rational and articulate mind.  thoreau thus 
simultaneously renders Whitman as subhuman (a beastly body with the 
rudiments of language, like a mouth without a mind) and superhuman 
(a person able to break the barrier of non-communication with the 
beasts).  thoreau invokes animality as a category that can include both 
non-human creatures and certain groups of humans—notably tribal 
peoples often characterized as “savages” and “primitives,” as well as 
slaves and the working classes, who depend wholly on their bodies for 
livelihood.  the classically educated thoreau is revolted by the poetry, 
but the naturalist and democratic thoreau is fascinated as animality is 
exposed as a restrictive and oppressive construct rather than a simple 
description of nature.  In identifying with those characterized as ani-
mals by dominant or master discourses, Whitman gives voice to the 
oppressed.  he also anticipates the current trend in animal studies to 
question old treatments of the “animal mind,” with “one study after 
another convincingly demonstrating that the traditionally distinctive 
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marks of the human (first it was possession of a soul, then ‘reason,’ 
then tool use, then tool making, then altruism, then language, then the 
production of linguistic novelty, and so on) flourish quite reliably beyond 
the species barrier” (Wolfe, 2).6
In the poem eventually titled “song of myself,” an early version of 
which thoreau singled out for special praise, the speaker—who calls 
himself “Walt Whitman, a kosmos” and the “friendly and flowing 
savage”—insists on an identity with the animals as a corrective to the 
processes of civilization that threaten to block the flow of physical and 
spiritual energy to humankind.  he has possession, he says, of “the 
pass-word primeval.”7  he channels “forbidden voices,/ Voices of sexes 
and lusts” and “Voices indecent … clarified and transfigur’d” by his 
poetry; he aims to “remove the veil” from “voices veiled” by cultural 
conventions and genteel manners:  “Voices of the interminable genera-
tions of prisoners and slaves, / . . . of the deform’d, trivial, flat, fool-
ish, despised, / fog in the air, beetles rolling balls of dung” (PP, 211). 
once considered sacred in the animistic culture of ancient egypt, the 
dung beetle was consigned to the lower echelons of the Great Chain of 
Being in the poet’s time, with God at the top, humans just below, and 
insects grubbing along at the last step between animals and plants.8 
Whitman flattens this hierarchy.  he also implies that once devalu-
ation of the animals begins, human beings themselves are not safe. 
the mention of slaves in these lines reminds us that in the nineteenth 
century, people classified as such were not considered fully human. 
African slaves were herded and sold like domestic beasts.  they were 
legally defined as “chattel,” a word etymologically equivalent to cattle 
and related to capital, the root meaning for which goes back to the word 
for head, as in heads of livestock, the countable items of property that 
can be reduced to a number and valued accordingly.  the images and 
voices of people bought and sold—slaves and prostitutes and the ex-
ploited masses—haunt the lines of Leaves of Grass.  the poet’s refusal 
to break ranks with those considered beastly because their bodies are 
exploited and their minds or souls neglected suggests that animality 
is a category in which people place living beings whom they want to 
master in some way.  By putting himself in that category, Whitman 
questions the universal difference of humans and animals and exposes 
the political motives of animalizing others.9
In “song of myself” the articulate voice indicates the presence of 
the soul that has been neglected in slaves and denied in animals.  sounds 
that most people would find disturbing or inconsequential—sounds 
filtered out as noise in the flow of information—admit a plentitude of 
meaning for the poet, a world of newfound sympathies and a path to 
restored kinship with nature and with humanity broadly defined.  he 
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hears, for example, the “wild gander” that “leads his flock through the 
cool night”:
Ya-honk he says, and sounds it down to me like an invitation,
the pert may suppose it meaningless, but I listening close,
find its purpose and place up there toward the wintry sky.  (PP, 199)
he represents the language of the goose roughly as he hears it, Ya-honk. 
the utterance has no equivalent in english.  At the end of the poem, 
he insists that “I too am not a bit tamed, I too am untranslatable,” as 
another great bird on high, the “spotted hawk swoops by” and speaks 
to him, complaining of his “gab” and “loitering” (PP, 247).  A slang 
term for the steady flow of impressive conversation, “gab” is considered 
a gift in human society, but a phrase like “the gift of gab” undercuts 
the very eloquence it ostensibly praises.  It is meaningless banter, the 
special province of the street hustler or the “loitering” criminal.  think 
of everett Ulysses mcGill in the Coen brothers’ film, O Brother, Where 
Art Thou?—an escaped convict who boasts of having the gift of gab. 
for him, as for Whitman, the phrase denotes a power of linguistic per-
formance but connotes the art of the snake-oil salesman and the con 
game.  As if in response to the hawk’s calling accusation, the poet says, 
“I sound my barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world” (PP, 247).  the 
Whitmanian yawp resonates with the ya-honk of the goose, the wild call 
of animal being that won’t be refined into language or debased into cheap 
or cheating speech.  Yawp and Ya-honk serve no purpose other than 
singing the song of oneself—expressing the soul, that is—and calling 
out to companions.  the gander, remember, “leads his flock through the 
cool night”; his Ya-honk sounds to Whitman “like an invitation” (PP, 
199).  A poet like Whitman’s old friend on the new York newspaper 
scene, William Cullen Bryant, would see in the flight of the goose an 
invitation to think of God’s goodness in leading his creatures home. 
In Whitman, not God, but the gander leads the flock.  Bryant’s “to a 
Waterfowl” suggests that as animals have their instincts, humans have 
their rational relationship to the higher power, their ability to reason 
out their salvation.10  Whitman says only that “I see in them and myself 
the same old law,” refusing to go further and reinforce the Great Chain 
of Being (PP, 199).  he places humans within nature rather than above 
it, one step closer to God.
Indeed, for Whitman, listening to the animals reveals the unhappi-
ness and discontentedness of modern humanity.  By contrast, he says, 
the animals are “placid and self-contained.”  not just the sound but 
also the silence of animals seems eloquent to him; he listens to what 
they do not say:
23
they do not sweat and whine about their condition,
they do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
they do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.  (PP, 218)
the great accomplishments of civilization—religion, material success, 
and government—are shown here to have their downsides:  sweaty and 
whining guilt, maniacal greed, and groveling submission to others.  the 
animals present alternatives to the speaker; they “show their relations 
to me” and bring “tokens of myself” (PP, 218).  these tokens indicate 
elements of the self left behind or buried deep by the forces of civiliza-
tion—or as edward Abbey was fond of calling it, “syphilization.”11  In 
a famously pre-darwinian reference to evolution, Whitman imagines 
himself “stucco’d with quadrupeds and birds all over”; he says he has 
“distanced what is behind me for good reasons” but can “call any thing 
back” when he desires it (PP, 217).12  the images suggest that the 
beasts are both behind him and within him.  the frame of his body is 
covered over with muscle derived from eating animals and from animal 
ancestry, and life is more of a journey than a hierarchy.  “In vain” the 
animals flee from him—the mastodon dissolving into the deep past or 
the buzzard “who houses herself with the sky,” the snake “that slides 
through the creepers and logs,” the elk that “takes to the inner passes of 
the woods,” or “the razor-bill’d auk” that “sails far north to labrador.” 
“I follow quickly,” says the poet, “I ascend to the nest in the fissure of 
the cliff” (PP, 218).  poetry provides the imaginative means, of course, 
but so does science as he reads it: the scientific imagination brings 
the mastodon back to life when it “retreats beneath its own powder’d 
bones” (PP, 218).
“song of myself” is a poem of recovery, a poem about gathering 
energy from animal life.  It is a poem about ascent rather than descent—
about arising from the bed of depression where people lie awake in the 
dark and weep for their sins, arising from the bent knee of oppressive 
government, and arising from the spiritual poverty of consumerism, the 
mania for owning things, which leaves people perpetually unsatisfied 
and unhappy.  It is about allowing the senses to awaken and spark the 
imagination that hears and responds to the voices of the beasts—within 
and without.13  
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the cultural aniMist, or the trend to neo-aniMisM
But Whitman doesn’t stop with this version of animality as he 
continues to expand Leaves of Grass with new poems in each edition. 
Besides raising questions about the definition of the human animal, as 
thoreau’s comment on the speaking beast in Whitman further suggests, 
a shift in cultural affinity also occurs.  It hearkens back to a time when 
animals did speak—a time we all know, recounted in stories we’ve heard 
all our lives.  once upon a time, a long time ago, when gods walked the 
earth, people communed with animals that shared the gift of speech. 
for one reason or another, depending on your cultural tradition, either 
people ceased to understand the beasts or animals lost their capacity 
to speak.  In imaginatively restoring communication with the animals, 
Whitman’s poetry uncovers or recreates a buried past—from ancient 
times or from childhood—when kinship with the animals was the norm 
in the worldview known as animism.  In Totem and Taboo, sigmund 
freud comments on this Weltanschauung:
the human race [has] in the course of ages developed three…great pictures of the 
universe:  animistic (or mythological), religious, and scientific.  of these, animism, 
the first to be created, is perhaps the one which is most consistent and exhaustive 
and which gives a truly complete explanation of the nature of the universe.…much of 
[which] still persists in modern life, either in the debased form of superstition or as 
the living basis of our speech, our beliefs and our philosophies.14
freud’s implication is that animism cannot be fully expunged by reli-
gion and science, both of which, in different ways, strive to disenchant 
the earth.  Religion disenchants nature by making spirit the exclusive 
province of God and a supplicant humanity.  science makes the material 
world the only reality but disenchants by denying spirit altogether.15  As 
freud suggests, however, these latter-day perspectives do not eliminate 
but rather cover a persistent animism that bubbles to the surface “as the 
living basis of our speech, our beliefs and our philosophies.”  not only 
in superstition, but also in the bedtime story, in dream and fantasy, in 
poetry and romance, this ancient foundation is revealed and the world 
re-enchanted.  
to what end?  for one thing, the reawakening of animism provides 
relief from the austerities of modern life; it colors the black-and-white 
world of modernity; it delights, gives pleasure, satisfies longings unful-
filled by work, church, and education.  this yearning for delight (some 
would say escape) underwrites productions like the recent disney film 
Enchanted, in which the animated world of an animistic magic kingdom 
is lost when a wicked witch casts an enchanted princess into a deep 
well.  At the end of a long transformative tunnel, she emerges from a 
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manhole in present-day new York as a flesh-and-blood woman in the 
costume of a princess.  Colorful cartoon characters yield to live actors 
portraying the working world of urban life.  the film thus awakens 
the etymological kinship of the words animism and animation, both of 
which—like animal itself—derive from the latin word for soul, anima. 
With the soulfulness of the modern world in question, communication 
with the animals becomes an issue.  A chipmunk that hitches a ride 
into the disenchanted land gains a puppet-like substantiality, but loses 
the ability to communicate in english.  And when the princess, like 
Cinderella, summons the wild animals to help her clean her benefactor-
family’s apartment, only rats, pigeons, and cockroaches respond, the 
survivors of declining biodiversity.
this image of species reduction hints lightly at an eco-political mo-
tive beyond the appeal to childlike wonder in the cinematic resurrection 
of magic princesses, enchanted forests, and talking beasts.  As James 
William Gibson suggests in the 2009 book A Reenchanted World: The 
Quest for a New Kinship with Nature, a serious revival of animism is the 
latest iteration of the critique of modernity that begins in nineteenth-
century Romanticism and continues in twentieth-century environ-
mentalism.16  the yearning evinced in films like Enchanted reveals that 
material progress has a psychic cost.  When the cost becomes too great, 
the discontents of civilization turn back or dig deep to conceive a kind 
of neo-animism, and with it, a form of renewed creative energy—call 
it animation.  We think of animation as a media practice.  But to be 
animated also means to be energized, brought to life from a dead state. 
Awakening to new life is a key aim of transcendentalist writers like 
emerson, thoreau, and Whitman.  to this end, Whitman’s poetry of 
the talking beast anticipates the neo-animistic and re-animated world 
of contemporary cinema from disney to Japanese animé.17
After the 1850s, in poems that thoreau was never able to read 
before his untimely death, Whitman’s talking animals grow increas-
ingly eloquent, and a more recognizably animistic perspective emerges. 
Instead of the gander’s ya-honk, which is less articulate even than the 
croaking “nevermore” of poe’s raven, we get the operatic birds of the 
1860s, the mockingbird that has lost his mate in “out of the Cradle 
endlessly Rocking” and the hermit thrush, the “solitary singer” in the 
great elegy on lincoln, “When lilacs last in the dooryard Bloom’d.” 
like the goose and the hawk in “song of myself,” these more talkative 
birds mentor the poet on aspects of life that seem just out of his reach. 
the mockingbird teaches the boy poet that out of the pain of loss comes 
great poetry.  the thrush consoles the mature poet in the more im-
mediate presence of death, leading him through the dismal swamp of 
his grief over the dead president.  the songs are no longer “untranslat-
able” like the ya-honk of the goose and the yawp of “flowing savage.” 
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the boy-poet in “out of the Cradle” insists on “translating the notes” 
of the mockingbird, addressing the bird as “my brother” and even the 
hissing ocean as “the savage old mother” that whispers “the low and 
delicious word death” (PP, 390; 392; 393).  likewise in the lincoln 
elegy, “the wondrous chant of the gray-brown bird”—again addressed 
as “dearest brother” (PP, 463)—produces a “tallying chant, the echo 
arous’d in my soul” (PP, 467).  Whitman goes to some effort to imitate 
the actual song of the natural mockingbird through the use of word 
and sound repetition and variations in line length.  he makes less of 
an effort with the thrush.  In both poems, Whitman distinguishes the 
song of the birds by the use of italics, but in “lilacs” the thrush’s song 
is otherwise weakly differentiated from the language of the poet’s voice 
in roman type.  there is a bit more repetition of triadic phrases like 
“praise! praise! praise!” (PP, 464), but not nearly as much as we find in 
“out of the Cradle.”  the movement thus runs from the ya-honk of 
the goose to the musical aria of the mockingbird to the stately poetry 
of the thrush, beginning with a kind of rough call-and-response (yawp 
to ya-honk) and ending with a sympathetic convergence of the inner 
psychological state of the poet with that of the natural creatures with 
whom he communes.
thus the talking birds of the later poems, to some degree, justify 
the trenchant commentary of the eco-critic dana phillips—that “the 
landscape in Whitman’s poetry always turns out to be an inscape”—the 
bird always turns out to be Whitman himself, the “echo” of his voice.18 
In this way, phillips says, Whitman anticipates “the therapeutic function 
and character” of much modern nature writing, the projection of the 
self “not as an ethically responsible entity and a citizen of the world, but 
as the locus of what passes for spiritual life in a secular culture” (200; 
195).19  over two decades of development, then, the poet increasingly 
speaks not from nature or with nature, but rather comes to speak for 
nature; or worse, he plays the ventriloquist to the dummies of nature, 
the birds and the hissing ocean.20
two poems that fall roughly at the beginning and end of this 
development in Whitman’s work—“this Compost” and “song of the 
Redwood-tree”—are particularly instructive.  In my book Walt Whit-
man and the Earth: A Study in Ecopoetics, I saw these poems as opposite 
numbers in Whitman’s shifting and conflicted eco-political views, 
with “this Compost” as perhaps the most ecologically enlightened 
english-language poem of the nineteenth century and “song of the 
Redwood-tree” as among the most sadly conventional celebrations of 
environmental devastation in the name of progress.21  Considered in 
light of the animistic revival, a somewhat different picture emerges. 
the earlier poem “this Compost” employs figurative language derived 
from Christianity, the theological terminology of religious conversion 
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and faith—death, resurrection, and belief—reinterpreted by science. 
the earth (capitalized) substitutes for the awe-inspiring Creator of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition:  “now I am terrified at the earth,” Whitman 
writes, “it is that calm and patient, / It grows such sweet things out of 
such corruptions, /… It gives such divine materials to men, and accepts 
such leavings from them at last” (PP, 496-497).  In the second edition 
of Leaves of Grass, when “this Compost” first appeared, its awkward 
but revealing title was “poem of Wonder at the Resurrection of the 
Wheat”—an allusion to the words of Jesus in John’s Gospel:  “unless 
a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains a single grain; 
but if it dies, it bears much fruit” (John 12.24 nRsV).  When in the 
drama of “this Compost,” the poet realizes that “summer growth is 
innocent and disdainful above all those strata of sour dead,” he initiates 
a series of celebratory exclamations with the phrase “What chemistry!” 
(PP, 286).
By contrast, in “song of the Redwood-tree,” Whitman replaces 
imagery derived from soil chemistry and Christianity with images 
drawn from animism—dryads and hamadryads, the spirits of the wood. 
the poet imagines listening to their voices as they resign themselves 
to the axes of a new race of creatures, the pioneers who harvest their 
wood to build and fuel a new civilization.  the poet pointedly remarks 
that the lumbermen do not hear what he hears, the voices of the spirits 
leaving the wood—which are italicized in this poem like the songs of 
the mockingbird in “out of the Cradle” and the thrush in “lilacs.”  In 
identifying with the forest spirits, Whitman sounds a note of resigna-
tion in the face of modernity, creating an elegiac mood that undercuts 
the conventional praise of western expansion, dramatizing not only 
the literal dis-enchantment of the old-growth forest, the driving out of 
ancient spirits, but also his personal disenchantment with the material 
progress of the nation.  so it is that, between the publication of “this 
Compost” in 1856 and “song of the Redwood-tree” in 1874, Whit-
man reverses the anthropological master narrative outlined by freud, 
abandoning science and religion for animistic mythology as the source 
of his imagery and his inspiration.22
that Whitman would concern himself at all with forest spirits at 
this late date anticipates the twentieth-century revival of animism in 
the unlikely fields of nature writing and eco-activism.  examples in-
clude Christopher manes’s adoption of animism as the spiritual core of 
political ecology; the anthropologist Richard nelson’s frequently cited 
work on indigenous metaphysics, which he adapts to his own ecological 
world view; and the inclusion of the resolute atheist Richard dawkins 
among science writers and poets joined by the eco-critic Gioia Woods 
under the rubric of “sci-animism.”23
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perhaps the best example of neo-animism comes from the world 
of animated cinema:  hayao miyazaki’s 1997 film Princess Mononoke.24 
A major contribution to the recent trends in the popular imagination, 
Princess Mononoke has attracted a wide audience during the recent bur-
geoning of adult interest in animated feature films, comics, and graphic 
novels and in products formerly marketed primarily to adolescents—
“young adult” or Y.A. literature and culture—the harry potter phe-
nomenon, which has also engaged a number of writers already known 
for work directed to a mainstream adult audience, such as sherman 
Alexie and Rita dove.25  miyazaki’s film tells the story of a young 
hero from a tribal culture who seeks to mediate the divided world of 
indigenous animism and industrial progress.  Replete with giant, talk-
ing animals, a ruling forest spirit in the shape of an elk with trees for 
antlers and a humanoid face, a smoking city of ironworks and firearms 
factories where former prostitutes find new status as respected workers 
under the guidance of a queenly matron and manager, and elfin spirit 
figures that look like elements from a retro video game, the plot is too 
subtle and complicated for a brief summary.  suffice it to say that the 
survival of animism in the modern world becomes the key topic when 
a fortune-seeking soldier cuts off the head of the great forest spirit, 
precipitating an apocalyptic event that threatens to destroy the earth. 
the hero retrieves and replaces the head in time, but the earth is ir-
revocably changed.  the great forest spirit loses any identity separate 
from the forest.  the human hero and forest princess vow to keep the 
memory of the spirit sacred, but can no longer hope to encounter the 
actual presence of spirit or talk to the animals.
the movement, I would argue, goes from indigenous animism to 
modern neo-animism, in which an imaginative effort is required to hold 
sacred what has been rendered mundane once and for all.  more so than 
“song of the Redwood-tree,” Princess Mononoke questions the values of 
unbridled military-industrialism, but like Whitman’s poem, it gives the 
nod to improvements in people’s lives made possible by technology and 
modernization—not just material betterment, but also social progress, 
as the case of the prostitutes shows—and to some degree it accepts the 
defeat of animism.  the neo-animistic trend certainly testifies to the 
difficulty of sustaining a consistently scientific, demystified, and prag-
matic view of nature.  But it also questions the possibility of recovering 
an animism that actually requires people to believe in spirits and give 
up the social and material progress of modernization.  It speaks to an 
unresolved conflict in the liberal imagination between the ideology of 
progress and preservationist trends in cultural environmentalism.26  In 
many ways, present-day talk of metaphysical phenomena like spirits in 
nature, or epiphanies and visions, is mainly a literary, cinematic, or rhe-
torical device.  It enlivens and energizes the discourse of nature that has 
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been demonized by religion and dried out by science.  It bestows value 
on creatures, places, and objects—animals, forests, and trees—com-
modified and reduced by the resource logic of consumerism.  Religion 
gives them value only in relation to God and humanity, thus reinforcing 
the capitalist model; and aspiring to a value-free discourse, pure science 
has little to do with assigning values.  But for a poet or cinematic artist 
or nature writer to say that animals speak to me, or that some place is 
sacred, or that some tree possesses a spirit is to say that these things 
have value beyond any price you can put on them.
(re-)aniMated
to get a sense of how completely Whitman’s later poems anticipate the 
neo-animism and the rhetorical mood, even the media choices, of recent 
nature writing and film, try imagining “out of the Cradle endlessly 
Rocking” or “song of the Redwood-tree” as animated short films.  It’s 
not very hard.  Anyone who has watched the disney version of the fairy 
tales or films that play upon the fantasy tradition nurtured by english 
authors like tolkien, lewis, and Rowling can quite easily picture a 
technicolor boy-poet creeping through shoreline shrubs to watch the 
mockingbirds on their nest or a wizardly Whitman with his long beard 
mourning the singing spirits that stream from falling redwoods as face-
less wood-cutters hack away at their trunks.
What is gained and what is lost in this thought experiment in anima-
tion?  the images might appeal strongly to the magic allegedly lost with 
the colonization of indigenous lands and cultures and with the defeat of 
childhood fantasy by adult practicality.  I say allegedly because postco-
lonial theory has taught us to be wary of a retrospective understanding 
of tribal cultures and practices that were maintained in linguistic and 
historical contexts very different from our own.27  We should be doubly 
wary of thinking that aligns so-called primitive ways of life with a child-
hood left behind by enlightened adulthood.  A reanimated worldview, 
realized in cartoons and fantasy stories for adults, alternately questions 
and reinforces the collapse of the distinction between the primitive and 
the childlike.  In associating these images with childhood, we prepare 
adolescents to abandon them for the adult frameworks of religion and 
contemporary science.  We suggest, contrary to work by anthropolo-
gists like Richard nelson and ethnobotanists like Gary nabhan, that 
indigenous peoples had no science when in fact many tribal cultures 
surpassed western science in their understanding of particular plants 
and animals.  In losing their animistic worldview, we may have lost that 
knowledge of natural history as well.
But in clinging to the animated version of animism in contemporary 
cinema and young-adult culture, we also risk accepting a version of 
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animism filtered through centuries of religion and western science—a 
cartoon version.  Cartoons are always to some degree caricatures.  they 
reduce complexity by emphasizing key features, as caricaturists identify 
their subjects by exaggerating a big nose or protruding ears.  What 
gets left out of these images may well be the most subtle and the most 
important markers of identity.  Acknowledging the complexity of flesh-
and-blood reality—or fur-and-bone, tree-and-bark reality, of cultural 
as well as biological diversity—may be the first step toward imagining 
new ways of relating to animals and plants, earth and stones, rain and 
sky, what we so blithely generalize as “nature” or “the environment” 
or “the animals.”  to hold communion with these elements, to talk to 
the animals as it were, we may need not so much to recover old ways 
of being, but to break free of the cycles of conflict among animism, 
religion, and science—none of which can fully satisfy the yearning and 
the real needs of an overpopulated, post-colonial, species-decimated 
world.  In short, we need to imagine new ways of being in the world.
As for Walt Whitman, I would argue that he was closer to this 
kind of new vision when he was animalizing the human in poems like 
“song of myself”— when he was asking “What do these animals have 
and what do they do that I cannot?”—than when he was spiritualizing 
humans and animals and oceans and trees in the later poems.  even 
the famous (or infamous) cataloguing technique of “song of myself” 
might be seen as a function of beastly speech.  this poetic technique 
fits quite well in the category of animal (and autistic) language and 
behavior that temple Grandin calls “hyper-specific”: “being hyper-
specific means you see the differences between things a lot better than 
you see the similarities.  You see the trees better than the forest.  A lot 
of times you might not see the forest at all.  Just trees, trees, and more 
trees.  Animals are like that” (218).  At that early point in his career, 
Whitman offered a picture of increasing complexity—evolution as an 
enfolding and inclusive process of aggregation as much as selection; 
nature as expanding, prolific, and spendthrift; and poetry as a genera-
tive act of image-gathering as prodigal as nature itself—in short, a set 
of ideals and values far more attractive than the declining complexity 
and predictability implied in the later trend to put a human face on the 
whole world and let the human voice speak for all.
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